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Abstract 
One of the pillars of trust-worthy computing is process 
isolation, the ability to keep process data private from 
other processes running on the same device.  While  
embedded operating systems provide isolation for the 
software part of these processes, there is no commonly 
accepted isolation mechanism for the hardware 
resources.  As a result, systems may remain vulnerable 
to hardware-based attacks.  This paper presents a 
secure coprocessor interface that extends the concept 
of process isolation into reconfigurable hardware.  In 
the resulting coprocessor design, context information 
for different processes concurrently accessing the 
coprocessor is physically kept private.  The 
coprocessor interface can handle context switches 
between different processes without assistance of the 
operating system.  Because of this, reconfiguration of 
computation units can occur independent of the main 
processor.  Moreover, it does so with greater efficiency 
than what is possible using software only. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 The internet is dominant for transferring information 
between machines and it is becoming increasingly 
important to protect this data.  The AES algorithm [1] is 
the new standard in symmetrical cryptography and has 
been the subject of hardware acceleration.  
Developments in this area focused on such design goals 
as fastest design [2], most efficient design [3], or the 
most flexible design [4,5].  However, none of these 
schemes addresses the issue of security between the 
different processes sharing a single coprocessor. 
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Figure 1.  Lack of hardware isolation in current architectures 
 
 In this paper, the terms task and process are used 
interchangeably.  Traditionally, these two software 
entities differ in the amount of context information that 
is considered private.  Since our coprocessor can secure 
context information for any software entity, the two 
terms are indistinguishable to the coprocessor. 
 On a server, there may be many different independent 
secure connections alive at any moment.  In current 
implementations, a separate software process using a 
shared coprocessor for cryptographic acceleration, 
handles each connection.  As Figure 1 shows, even 
though a secure operating system can enforce isolation, 
the coprocessor still can leak information between 
independent processes through the coprocessor 
registers. 
 Multitasking operating system security focuses on 
the implementation of two main goals: resource access 
control and resource isolation [6].  Resource access 
control is the assignment of permissions to use system 
resources.   The classic trusted operating system 
heavily relies on the access control strategy by 
explicitly assigning access rights to processes and 
controlling the interaction between users and various 
system objects (such as files, IPC, and the network 
stack).   Resource isolation ensures that data from one 
process is not able to leak to another process.  This is 
the strategy of UNIX processes where each instance of 
an application runs in its own virtual address space. 
 Though access to the coprocessor can be managed in 
the OS, process isolation remains a problem.  This 
paper describes a coprocessor interface that addresses 
this issue.  Direct application of the results of this work 
increases security by complementing and enhancing 
existing security design techniques. 
 Security in computing systems is often associated 
with the notion of trusted computing.  Work in this area 
mainly focuses on mechanisms to ensure that only 
trusted software is allowed to be installed or executed.  
Though well promoted by industry, the effectiveness of 
such an approach is debatable [7,8].  In this paper, we 
focus on providing security by process isolation though 
a secure channel; malicious programs may run on our 
system, but they cannot interfere with or snoop on other 
processes.  The idea of using hardware to provide 
isolation has been explored in several related works.  
Trusted Logic [10] offers an operating system 
framework that isolates security services from their 
environment.  A secure hardware channel is established 
so that application software can communicate with 
software security services.  In our work, security 
services are implemented in hardware and the secure 
communication channel is established by the 
coprocessor interface. 
 The security architecture of the CELL Broadband 
Engine [11] processor is able load a program onto one 
of its Synergistic Processor Element (SPE) cores and 
run it in isolation mode.  In this mode, neither the 
executing program or its data can be observed or 
manipulated.  This framework, however, limits the 
interactivity of the isolated program with other 
processes in the system.  Our scheme provides a secure 
hardware interface where interactive services can be 
easily accessed by other software processes. 
 We also differentiate our system from FPGA security 
in general, which focuses on protecting the bitstream 
that describes the system’s hardware configuration.  
Our system protects the data from processes in the 
system and not the actual hardware. 
 Processor / coprocessor communication overheads 
are a large source of system inefficiency.  Overheads 
include coprocessor reconfiguration time and 
transmission of context information before a 
calculation can occur.  Each process that needs 
cryptographic services has its own secret key, initial 
vectors, and modes of operation.  This problem 
severely limits the AES core from achieving its full 
potential, and is most noticeable in common internet 
communications where short bursty data packets 
dominate [9]. 
 This paper describes a new type of coprocessor 
interface that addresses the issues of security and 
performance in a reconfigurable platform.  It provides a 
mechanism to ensure security between software 
processes (some of which may be malicious) and to 
minimize the overhead associated with context 
switching between multiple processes and hardware 
reconfiguration.  In addition, since these features do not 
require any OS support, existing systems can 
incorporate them easily.  The processor described in 
this paper uses a generic AES core but the scheme is 
applicable to any other type of crypto-coprocessor. 
 Section 2 describes the function of the coprocessor 
and its place in common system architectures.  To 
illustrate problems with traditional interfaces, we give 
some motivating examples.   Section 3 describes the 
architecture of the AES secure multitasking 
coprocessor.  Section 4 presents the results of synthesis 
and system co-simulation.  Finally, Section 5 concludes 
with the main ideas. 
 
2. System Architecture 
 Figure 2 shows three possible system architectures 
for an AES coprocessor.  The dashed lines represent the 
flow of data and the solid lines represent the flow of 
control signals.  In Figure 2a, the coprocessor directly 
connects to the microprocessor.  This means that both 
data and control signals must pass through the 
microprocessor, making this the main bottleneck in an 
AES operation.  In the second architecture (Figure 2b), 
the coprocessor connects directly to a streaming 
interface that will supply the data.  With this 
architecture, the microprocessor only deals with control 
of the coprocessor and interactions proceed on a 
block-by-block basis rather than a word-by-word basis. 
 
memory
uproc
Dsp/ 
mem
memory
uproc
AES Net/
mem
dsp AES
memory
uproc
Dsp/ 
mem
AES Net/
mem
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2. Different system architectures: a) simple 
coprocessor interface, b) streaming coprocessor interface, and 
c) hybrid coprocessor interface 
 
 The most significant source of communications 
overhead is the transfer of context.  Cryptographic 
context is the process specific data such as the secret 
key, the mode of operation, and initial values.  The 
transfer of this information for each process not only 
reduces system efficiency, but also increases the risk of 
data interception. 
 Architecture 2a may seem to incur a large overhead 
but has the benefit of a more traditional architecture and 
is more appropriate for interactive type applications 
such as a telnet session.  Architecture 2b is more 
appropriate for processing of continuous streaming data 
or large data blocks.  To maintain architectural 
flexibility, the multitasking AES processor 
simultaneously supports both of these architectures 
(Figure 2c). 
 Allowing reconfiguration of the AES coprocessor 
can also increase system processing overhead.  Though 
the processing components within the coprocessor can 
dynamically change to improve system performance, 
this usually requires the suspension of all calculations 
while reconfiguration takes place.  Our system avoids 
this obstruction by modular design of the coprocessor 
architecture and implementation of a transaction based 
interface. 
 We now present two motivating examples that 
illustrate the purpose of our multitasking coprocessor 
interface.  The examples illustrate security and context 
switching operations.   
 
2.1  Security Example 
 One possible attack can occur at the moment that a 
process has just used the coprocessor to encrypt a 
command to a remote server.  A malicious process may 
then use the same coprocessor without reprogramming 
the settings to send its own data to the remote server, 
essentially spoofing the identity for the first process. 
 In a related attack, the malicious process can partially 
reprogram the coprocessor by just changing modes 
from encryption to decryption.  The previous encoded 
output can then be reinserted into the coprocessor to 
reveal the unencrypted message. 
 With current coprocessors, this can be prevented by 
having the tasks reset the coprocessor after each 
operation.  However, this solution imposes additional 
overhead, because it increases the period within which 
the coprocessor interface will remain locked by a single 
task.  Moreover, it leaves the responsibility of security 
on the design of the operating system.  Operating 
systems themselves are very complicated software 
structures. 
 The idea of the multitasking AES coprocessor is to 
have a hardware solution to this problem.  The 
cryptographic state of a process will be securely stored 
and managed on the coprocessor itself.  To guarantee 
security of the state information, a separate dedicated 
controller manages the state of each process. 
 
2.2  Context Switch Example 
 Assume that a single AES coprocessor encrypts two 
channels of streaming data.  Each channel has a 
different mode of operation and different keys.  The 
streaming data is time sensitive and must have its 
latency bounded by a certain value.  For a traditional 
interface, this would mean that the operating system 
would have to manage the context switching between 
these two tasks.  The overhead due to software context 
switching and repeated interactions with the 
coprocessor is a limitation on the total throughput of the 
system. 
 A system with many processes having bursty data 
illustrates an extreme example of context switching.  
This situation is not unusual in a VPN server, which 
handles large number of secure interactive sessions. 
 The multitasking AES coprocessor stores the 
contexts (process specific data such as the key and 
mode of operation) of the processes in the coprocessor.  
This means that for streaming applications, the 
bandwidth of the AES core is shared among the active 
tasks with no time lost to context switching.  For 
extremely bursty traffic, the context information is 
already stored on chip; therefore, overheads associated 
with processor-coprocessor interactions are minimized. 
 
3.  AES Coprocessor  
 
3.1  AES Algorithm 
The AES cipher is a block cipher [1], which means 
that encryption and decryption operate only on fixed 
blocks of data.  In our implementation, 128 bit is the 
block size. 
The algorithm consists of five main operators: 
AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, 
and KeyExpansion.  The inverse of these operators are 
used for decryption.  Figure 3 shows the how these 
operators are used to perform encryption and 
decryption. 
 
Encryption Decryption 
AddRoundKey 
For round = 1 to 9 
SubBytes 
ShiftRows 
MixColumns 
AddRoundKey 
SubBytes 
ShiftRows 
AddRoundKey 
AddRoundKey 
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Figure 3:  Pseudocode for AES encryption and decryption 
In both encryption and decryption algorithms, there 
is a FOR loop that runs through four of these steps.  
Hardware is efficiently realized by implementing only 
this group of operations (a single round) into hardware.  
The same hardware can then be used several times to 
perform a single encryption or decryption operation. 
 
3.2  Coprocessor Architecture 
Figure 4 shows the main logical blocks in the 
coprocessor. The processor interface block accepts 
instructions from the microprocessor through a 
memory-mapped interface.  This block will then assign 
the work to one of the agent blocks.  The agent blocks 
are dedicated controllers that are able to perform AES 
encryption and decryption in any mode of operation.  
The agent blocks each have enough registers to store 
the state of the calculation.  The AES core performs the 
actual calculations.  In our implementation example, 
this is a purely combinational block, which performs a 
single round of encryption or decryption; eleven rounds 
are necessary to perform a single AES calculation.   
Figure 4. Architecture of multitasking coprocessor 
 
 There are several agents in the coprocessor  
managing multiple AES cores (each responsible for 
calculating a single round).  The number of these 
elements change depending on the throughput and 
latency requirements of the system.  A round robin 
scheduling algorithm is used to ensure fair access to the 
AES cores.  Memory read and write access control 
blocks are available to support the streaming or block 
processing architecture of Figure 2b.  For easy 
integration with popular architectures, all interfaces are 
32-bit buses. 
 Both encryption and decryption support the 
following modes of operation:  electronic codebook 
(ECB), cipher block chaining (CBC), cipher feedback 
(CFB), output feedback (OFB), and counter (CTR).  
Such flexibility enables support of a wide variety of 
popular security protocols including IPSec, SSH, and 
SSL/TLS. 
 The following subsections explain the detailed 
functions of the main blocks in our coprocessor 
architectures.  This includes the processor interface, 
agent blocks, and access control. 
 
3.3  Processor Interface 
 The microprocessor connects to the coprocessor 
through a memory-mapped interface.  The processor 
interface uses an instruction set designed to minimize 
the amount of communications necessary.  Figure 5 
shows the format of the instructions the coprocessor 
receives.  Depending on the type of command, zero or 
more of the optional fields are used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Instruction format of the coprocessor 
 
 The normal use of the protocol is shown in Figure 6 
and proceeds in the following manner:  A process sends 
a command to the coprocessor to reserve some 
resources for future calculations.  If resources are 
available, the coprocessor grants the request by 
returning a random and unique ID number.  Future 
commands will use this ID number to reference the 
cryptographic context in which calculations occur.  At 
the end of a process' life, the processor gives the 
command to the coprocessor to release the reserved 
resources.  
Set up context
Return unique 
random ID number
Use ID number to 
issue commands
Close context 
(end of job)
Processor Coprocessor

Figure 6.  Processor / coprocessor interface protocol 
 
 It should be noted that the protocol allows a software 
process to identify it’s assigned agent through the 
random ID number.  However, the reverse is not true.  
The hardware agent cannot identify its corresponding 
process and implicitly trust all processes based on the 
ID number. 
 The protocol also allows using the coprocessor 
without the reservation of resources.  In this case, the 
coprocessor will return the result upon the completion 
of the calculation. 
 Table 1 shows the five types of commands that are 
available and the amount of communications needed to 
complete them. 
Agent
1
Agent
n
Processor interface
…
AES round
core 1
AES access control
Read
Mem
Access
control
Write
Mem
Access
Control
…
AES round
core m
Cmd (3) Mode(4) ID number (24)
Read address (32)
Write address (32)
Block size (10)
Key (128)
Data (128)
Initial vector or
Counter value (128)
Optional
Instruction
fields
TABLE 1.  Commands accepted by the coprocessor 
Cmd Description Return 
value 
Words 
rd+wr 
Agent 
setup 
Reserve and 
configure an agent 
for AES calculation 
ID 
number 
or 
FALSE 
9+1 
Agent 
check 
Check to see if 
previous calculation 
has been completed 
DONE or 
FALSE 
1+1 
Agent 
release 
Clear a certain 
context from the 
coprocessor 
DONE or 
FALSE 
1+1 
Agent 
single 
Perform a single 
preset AES 
calculation 
AES 
result or 
FALSE 
5+4 
Agent 
continuous 
Perform a series of 
preset AES 
calculations taking 
data directly from 
memory 
DONE or 
FALSE 
4+1 
Immediate Perform a single 
AES calculation 
AES 
result or 
FALSE 
13+4 
 
3.4  Agent Blocks 
 The architecture of the agent block is shown in 
Figure 7.  These blocks are responsible for managing 
calculations for a single process.  The task given to an 
agent may be to encrypt a large data file.  In this case, 
the agent block retrieves the data from memory, 
performs multiple AES calculations, and then writes 
the encrypted data back to memory.  Because there is a 
tight coupling between a software process and it’s agent, 
many agents blocks exist within the multitasking 
coprocessor. 
 The agent consists of a small finite state machine 
with a collection of registers to remember the state of 
AES calculations. 
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Figure 7. Architecture of the agent blocks 

 The values stored in the registers add up to 722 bits of 
data and contribute to over 60% of the area of this block.  
In designs where many agents are required, area can be 
saved by using an AES core that performs a full AES 
calculation; intermediate data storage (which accounts 
for 30% of the total registers) will not be required in the 
agent.  The result is a larger AES core and a system 
with slightly longer latencies.  Instead of registers, a 
common RAM module for all the agents can also 
achieve a more area efficient but lower performance 
design. 
 
3.5  Access Control 
 Access control blocks regulate admission to the AES 
core and the external memory blocks by the agents.  
Each of these blocks implements a round robin priority 
scheduler.  This means that the priority of the agents to 
use the resources rotates each clock cycle.  This ensures 
fairness among the agents competing to use the 
resources and guarantees that all calculations 
experience the same latency. 
 
3.6  Reconfiguration 
 The interface protocol introduced in subsection 3.3 is 
transaction based.  It serves to isolate the requests made 
by the main processor from the active components 
performing the computation.  In a reconfigurable 
system, this allows the number of agents and AES cores 
to change without the knowledge of the application 
software.  This results in smaller and more portable 
software (multiple versions for each dynamic 
configuration is no longer necessary). 
 The AES coprocessor can be configured by 
specification of the number of agent blocks and 
associated AES cores.  The two parameters, the number 
of agents and the number of AES cores, affect the 
performance of the system differently.  The number of 
agent blocks determine the number of simultaneous 
processes that may be handled.  The number of AES 
cores determine the maximum throughput which the 
system can support.  For an efficient system, these two 
parameters are determined based on the required 
throughput and latency of the processes. 
 The agents and AES cores all operate independently 
from each other.  The agents are isolated from the main 
processor through the processor interface block.  The 
AES cores are isolated from the agents through the 
access control block.  Because of this modular 
architecture, it is possible to add or remove elements 
dynamically without halting currently running 
processes.  This further increases the efficiency of the 
platform. 
4.  Results 
 We implemented and tested the coprocessor design in 
our system design environment.  The following 
sections analyze the resulting performance and cost of 
the system.   
 
4.1  Design Size and Speed 
 To examine the relative size of each of the modules in 
the design, we synthesized the design for the Virtex-II 
Pro FPGA using Synplicity.  Table 2 shows the results. 
 
TABLE 2.  Size and speed of modules in the coprocessor 
Module Slices Critical 
path (ns) 
AES core 3037 -- 
AES access controller 132 2.9 
Agent (each unit) 1065 7.6 
Read memory access 
controller 
186 6.2 
Write memory access 
controller 
12 1.9 
Microprocessor interface 623 5.8 
 
 Agents take up about a third the area of the AES core.  
This suggests that system performance can be easily 
increased by adding agents and increasing system 
efficiency.  The resulting area/performance ratio will be 
lower than if only AES cores are added to the 
coprocessor. 
 
4.2  Performance Analysis 
 In order to show the benefits of our coprocessor 
design at the system level, we analyze its performance 
using real world data.  Studies such as [12] shows that 
90% of internet traffic is under 1Kbytes.  In our test 
scenario, a packet size of 1Kbytes is assumed.  We can 
then measure the time it takes to process each of these 
packets.  Table 3 shows the results of the comparison. 
 
TABLE 3.  Comparison of overhead for bursty traffic loads 
 Context 
switch 
(cycles) 
AES calc 
(cycles) 
Total  
Time 
(cycles) 
efficie
ncy 
Multitasking 54 63 117 54 % 
Traditional 194 63 257 25 % 
 
 This result shows that the multitasking interface can 
handle more than twice the number of 1Kbyte packets 
as the traditional coprocessor interface.  However, the 
actual AES core is still running at half its capacity.  This 
suggests that further improvements are possible in the 
instruction set design of this type of coprocessor.  
Future versions should further optimize the design to 
increase the capacity for the bursty traffic model. 
 The coprocessor is also able to encrypt several 
continuous data streams.  This traffic pattern is 
common for multimedia type applications.  Latency is 
often important in teleconferencing applications and 
they exhibit this type of traffic pattern.  Table 4 shows 
how the latency changes as the coprocessor processes 
multiple data streams. 
 
TABLE 4.  Comparison of latency for different number of 
simultaneous streams 
Number of 
simultaneous 
streams 
Multitasking 
interface latency 
(clock cycles) 
Traditional 
interface latency 
(clock cycles) 
1 22 12 
2 28 400 
3 36 594 
4 48 788 
 
 For a single stream, the traditional approach 
outperforms the new multitasking interface approach.  
However, for multiple data streams the multitasking 
coprocessor is able to scale much more gradually.  In 
our interface, context switching is performed in 
hardware at the AES round level.  Consequently, the 
latency increases much more gradually. 
 This effect becomes much more serious for 
traditional interfaces when implemented in a network 
that processes both bursty packets and continuous 
streams.  The high frequency of bursts can severely 
degrade the latency of the stream processes. 
 Note that agents are hardware objects designed to 
make efficient use of the computational resource, in this 
case, the computation of one AES round.  The overall 
throughput of the system, however, is limited by the 
AES core.  For systems requiring increased throughput, 
multiple cores must be created. 
 
4.3  Application Profile 
 A secure data server application was implemented on 
top of multithreaded software simulation platform.  
When a client establishes a connection with the server, 
a key and encryption mode of operation is negotiated.  
Data is then encrypted and sent to the client.  Several 
clients can be handled simultaneously and a process is 
created to manage each connection.  The footprint of 
the different software components is shown in Table 5. 
 
TABLE 5.  Size of software components 
Server Application 2,794 bytes 
SW AES 33,536 bytes 
Coprocessor interface drivers 2,928 bytes 
Quickthreads library 1,868 bytes 
Multithreaded TCP/IP 
communications stack 
106,957 bytes 
System calls 4,508 bytes 
TOTAL 152,591 bytes 
 
From the system point of view, the size of the software 
can be reduced by 20% if a coprocessor is used to 
perform AES encryption.  This shows that for a data 
server application, it is possible to reduce cost, increase 
performance and increase security together with our 
proposed coprocessor. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 Though security in multitasking systems is 
traditionally the domain of the operating system, 
hardware solutions can offer similar protections.  This 
paper describes a coprocessor interface for 
crypto-processors that prevents the access or use of 
secret information from software processes running on 
a common processor.   
 Conventional coprocessor interfaces do not offer any 
features to protect data in a multitasking environment.  
In addition, because of the high context switch times, 
overall system throughput is degraded under bursty 
traffic loads. 
 The coprocessor interface described in this paper 
address both these issues.  The use of small-distributed 
agents in the coprocessor physically separates data 
from different software processes.  By assigning unique 
and random ID numbers to agents, software processes 
running on the microprocessor are unable to access data 
from one another.   
 We demonstrate that secure coprocessors do not need 
the support of a large and complicated software 
infrastructure.  Because of this independence, the 
coprocessor interface can be added to existing systems 
with minimal design overhead. 
 Traditional solutions to multitasking security 
explicitly define resources to which a process has 
access.  In this work, services are not denied if 
resources are available.  Instead, security is created 
through the protection of cryptographic contexts that 
exist in the system.  A software process binds to its 
context in the coprocessor through the 24-bit ID 
number assigned at time of creation.  
 In addition to greater security, performance is also 
improved.   There is tight coupling between the access 
control blocks and the agents.  This allows efficient 
sharing of the AES cores so that the maximum 
throughput is maintained even during multiple 
simultaneous executions of calculations having 
different modes of operation.  The access control blocks 
also serve to isolate the processing elements.  This 
allows reconfiguration of the coprocessor without 
suspension of calculations in progress. 
 The concepts described can be adapted to apply to 
any previously designed AES core and directly adds the 
security and multitasking features necessary in real 
systems.  The number of agents in the coprocessor is 
easily adjustable at design time to tune the performance 
for particular expected traffic patterns. 
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